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]
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;

Appellate Court No. 910489

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a Final Order of the District Court
for the First Judicial District of the State of Utah, in and for
the County of Cache. Since the instant case does not involve any
of the types of decisions by a district court which give the Court
of Appeals jurisdiction pursuant to § 78-2a-3 Utah Code Ann.
(1953), the Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction in accordance
with § 78-2-2(3)(j) Utah Code Ann. (1953).
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ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Does

Utah

permit parties

to a private

contract

having

substantial contacts with Utah to provide that venue may be in a
state other than Utah?
Does Utah permit parties to a private contract having such
substantial contacts with Utah that venue would otherwise lie in
courts of Utah to provide that venue may only be in courts of a
state other than Utah?
Did the forum-selection clause in the Master License and
Marketing Agreement between Lundahl Instruments, Inc. and Safety
Technology, Inc. limit venue for a suit based on nonpayment by
Safety Technology for units ordered from and provided by Lundahl
Instruments exclusively to courts in the State of California?
The standard for review concerning each of these issues is
correctness of the trial court's ruling. See Mountain Fuel Supply
ye Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988) and Scharf v. BMG
Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1970 (Utah 1985).

STATUTES AND RULES
The

following

statutes

and

rules

are

subject

interpretation by this Court:
§ 78-13-9, Utah Code Annotated (1953):
The court may, on motion, change the place of trial
in the following cases:
(1) when the county designated in the complaint is
not the proper county.

to
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(2)
when there is reason to believe that an
impartial trial cannot be had in the county, city, or
precinct designated in the complaint.
(3) when the convenience of witnesses and the ends
of justice would be promoted by the change.
(4)
when all the parties to an action, by
stipulation or by consent in open court entered in the
minutes, agree that the place of trial may be changed to
another county.
Thereupon the court must order the
change as agreed upon.
§ 78-13-4, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended*
When the defendant has signed a contract in the
state to perform an obligation t an action on the
contract may be commenced and tried in the following
venues:
(1) If the action is to enforce an interest in
real property securing a consumer's obligation, the
action may be brought only in the county where the real
property is located or where the defendant resides.
(2) An action to enforce an interest other than
under Subsection (1) may be brought in the county where
such obligation is to be performed, the contract was
signed, or in which the defendant resides.
§ 78-13-7, Utah Code Annotated (1953):
In all other cases the action must be tried in the
county in which the cause of action arises, or in the
county in which any defendant resides at the
commencement of the actioni pro\ided, that if any such
defendant is a corporation, any county in which such
corporation has its principal office or place of
business shall be deemed the county in which such
corporation resides within the meaning of this section.
If none of the defendants resides in this state, such
action may be commenced and tried in any county which
the plaintiff may designate in his complaint; and if the
defendant is about to depart from the state, such action
may be tried in any county where any of the parties
resides or service is had, subject, however, to the
power of the court to change the place of trial as
provided by law.
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Article VIII, Section 5, Constitution of Utah, prior to 1985
repeals
The state shall be divided into seven judicial
districts, for each of which, at least one judge shall
be selected as hereinbefore provided. Until otherwise
provided by law, a district court at the county seat of
each county shall be held at least four times a year.
All civil and criminal business arising in any county,
must be tried in such county, unless a change of venue
be taken, in such cases as may be provided by law. Each
judge of a district court shall be at least twenty-five
years of age, an active member of the bar in good
standing, learned in the law, a resident of the state of
Utah three years next preceding his selection, and shall
reside in the district for which he shall be selected.
Any district judge may hold a district court in any
county at the request of the judge of the district, and,
upon a request of the governor it shall be his duty to
do so. Any cause in the district court may be tried by
a judge pro tempore, who must be a member of the bar,
sworn to try the cause, and agreed upon by the parties,
or their attorneys of record. (As amended November 7,
1944, effective January 1, 1945.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE AND COURSE OF THE CASE
Lundahl Instruments, Inc., Plaintiff and Appellant (a Utah
corporation),
Technology,

brought
Inc.,

the

Defendant

instant

action

and

Appellee

against
(a

Safety

California

corporation), to recover the price for goods delivered to Safety
Technology.

An agreement between the two corporations, which

Lundahl Instruments argues was terminated in February, 1991,
contained a forum-selection clause.

Because of the clause, the

trial court granted Safety Technology's Motion To Dismiss on
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September 30, 1991 (Record at 53-55).

And Lundahl Instruments,

consequently, filed the instant appeal.
STATEMENTS OF FACT
Lundahl Instruments, Incc, Plaintiff and Appellant (a Utah
corporation), and Safety Technology, Inc., Defendant and Appellee
(a California corporation), voluntarily, knowingly, and at arm's
length executed a Master License and Marketing Agreement dated
April 21, 1989.

(Record at 53.)

This Agreement

provided

that Lundahl

Instruments

would

develop an ultrasonic sensing system and would sell such system to
Safety Technology, which was given an exclusive license to market
and sell the system and was obligated to use its best efforts to
do so.

(The information in the preceding sentence is, because of

the early dismissal of this case, not in the record; it is
provided here simply to give the Court background data and not as
a basis for decision.)
The Agreement was - except for minor details - negotiated by
both parties in Utah. Lundahl Instruments signed the Agreement in
Utah; Safety Technology executed the Agreement in California.
(Record at 45.)
The ultrasonic sensing system was developed and manufactured
in Utah.

(Record at 46.)

Safety Technology ordered a number of units of the ultrasonic
sensing systems from Lundahl Instruments, which accepted such
orders at its place of business in Cache County by sending such
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units and executing invoices therefor between August 16, 1990, and
April 26, 1991.

(Record at 2, 6-21, 46.)

Safety Technology was to send payment for the units to Cache
County, Utah.

(Record at 46.)

was $38,185.72.

The total principal amount owed

On October 1, 1990, Safety Technology paid

$1,684.00; on April 23, 1991, $1,064.00.

Safety Technology made

no further payment, leaving a principal balance of $35,437.72.
(Record at 2, 6-19.)
Terms on the invoices obligated Safety Technology to pay
interest at the rate of one and one-half percent (1.5%) per month
on all accounts over thirty (30) days old and to pay Lundahl
Instruments

any

collection

costs

or

expenses

involved

in

collecting a past due account, including reasonable attorney's
fees.

(Record at 2, 6-19, especially 19.)

For units Safety Technology had ordered and received prior to
those discussed above, Safety Technology owed Lundahl Instruments,
as of June 22, 1990, interest in the amount of $10,895.32.
(Record at 3, 21.)
The units were sent by Lundahl Instruments from Cache County,
Utah, on a common carrier to Safety Technology in California.
(Record at 46.)
Lundahl Instruments has maintained in Cache County, Utah, the
documentation

demonstrating

the

ordering

of

the

units, the

acceptance of those orders, shipping of the units, invoicing for
these shipments, and Safety Technology's nonpayment.
46.)

(Record at
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The Agreement contains a clause which says, in pertinent
parts
Yenue for any litigation arising out of this
Agreement, or in connection with the transactions
contemplated hereby, shall lie in any federal or state
court sitting in Defendant's state, with proper
jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof. Therefor,
if Lundahl were to commence an action against STI,
jurisdiction would be in California; if STI were to file
an action against Lundahl, jurisdiction would be in
Utah.
(Record at 54.)
Lundahl Instruments filed the instant action on June 6, 1991;
and the District Court dismissed the action on September 30, 1991,
based upon Section 78-13-4 Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended.
(Record at 1, 53-55.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Opinions

of the United States Supreme Court concerning

contractual stipulations for venue, i.e.., forum-selection clauses,
are by their own terms limited to diversity cases and admiralty
cases, where
clauses.

federal

law governs

the enforceability

of the

This leaves each state with the freedom to develop its

own policy.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that it should not
permit venue to be changed unless the Utah Legislature has
provided therefor.

And the relevant statutes permit a change of

venue only from one county in Utah to another county in Utah.
Moreover, even if the decisions by the United States Supreme Court
were

applicable, the policy expressed

by the Utah

statutes
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concerning venue would preclude enforcement of the instant forumselection clause.
But, in any event, the language in the instant clause merely
purported to allow venue in another state, not to deprive the Utah
courts of venue.
And termination of the underlying agreement ended any effect
which the forum-selection clause would otherwise have had over an
action to recover from Safety Technology the price for goods
ordered from and shipped by Lundahl Instruments.

ARGUMENT
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HAS NOT ISSUED
A CONTROLLING OPINION CONCERNING CONTRACTUAL
STIPULATIONS FOR VENUE.
Three (3) decisions have been issued by the United States
Supreme Court concerning contractual stipulations for venue: M/S
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Stewart
Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S.

(1988); and

, 113 L.Ed. 2d

622 (1991).
Although these decisions upheld the enforceability of the
specific

forum-selection

clauses

in

question,

they

are

inapplicable to the instant situation. Bremen and Carnival Cruise
Lines were based upon admiralty law, and Stewart Organization was
a federal diversity case where " . . . federal law, specifically 28
U.S.Cc § 1404(a), governs the District Court's decision whether to
give effect to the parties' forum-selection clause . . . "

487

9
U.S. 22, 32 (1988) . Similarly, in Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 D.S.
, 113 L.Ed 2d 622, 629 (1991), the Court had said, "We begin
by noting the boundaries of our inquiry. First, this is a case in
admiralty, and federal law governs the enforceability of the
forum-selection clause we scrutinize.
And in Bremen, 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) the Court observed,
"Forum-selection clauses have historically not been favored by
American courts. Many courts, federal and state, have declined to
enforce such clauses on the ground that they were "contrary to
public

policy,'

or

that

their

jurisdiction" of the court."

effect

was

to

'oust

the

In footnote 10, the Court then gave

examples of such rulings. The Court did, though, in footnote 11,
provide citations to cases which advanced the view " . . . that
such clauses are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless
enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be 'unreasonable'
under the circumstances."

407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972).

And the Court

announced that it believed " . . . this is the correct doctrine to
be followed by federal district courts sitting in admiraltyc" 407
U.S. 1, 10 (1972) (emphasis added).
The crucial point, however, is that the United States Supreme
Court has recognized that each state is entitled to develop its
own

policy

concerning

the

stipulations concerning venue.

enforceability

of

contractual
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THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ENFORCE A FGRUM-SELECTXGN
CLAUSE PROVIDING FOR VENUE IN ANOTHER STATE
WHEN VENUE WOULD OTHERWISE BE PROPER IN UTAH
UNTIL THE LEGISLATURE OF UTAH HAS EXPLICITLY
PROVIDED THEREFOR*
In State v. Cauble, 563 P.2d 775, 111

(Utah 1977), the

Supreme Court of Utah quoted from the then existing version of
Article VIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution:
. . . All civil and criminal business arising in any
county, must be tried in such county, unless a change of
venue be taken, in such cases as may be provided by law.
The Court continued by explaining that White v. Rio Grande
Western Rv, Co. , 25 Utah 346, 71 P. 593 (1903), had " . . . pointed
out that the Constitution merely recognizes the existing commonlaw doctrine of venue and intends to prohibit a change of venue
except when authorized by law".
Thus, this Court has recognized that it should not enforce a
forum-selection clause providing for venue in another state when
venue would otherwise be proper in Utah unless the Legislature of
Utah has explicitly provided therefor.

And the Legislature has

not done so.
In pertinent part, § 78-13-9 Utah Code Annotated

(1953)

provides, "The court may, on motion, change the place of trial in
the following cases . . . (4) when all the parties to an action,
by stipulation or by consent in open court entered in the minutes,
agree that the place of trial may be changed to another county.
Thereupon the court must order the change as agreed upon."
It seems apparent that "stipulation" in this section means a
written agreement entered by the parties after the commencement of
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litigation and that "another county'* means another county within
the State of Utah*

Despite the fact that a highly strained

interpretation could find that the section permits pre-litigation
contractual stipulations to compel a change of venue to a county
in another state , it seems extremely unlikely that the Legislature
would allow the courts of this state to be deprived of the ability
to adjudicate cases affecting the citizens of this state without
clearly and explicitly so stating.
Until April 23, 1990, the relevant statutory directive on
venue concerning written contracts, Utah Code Annotated § 78-13-4,
reads
When the defendant has contracted in writing to perform
an obligation in a particular county of the state and
resides in another county, an action on such contract
obligation may be commenced and tried in the county
where such obligation is to be performed or in which the
defendant resides.
Understandably but unfortunately, this is the version of
S 78-13-4 which the trial court erroneously concluded to be
currently in force and to control the enforceability of the forum
-selection clause in question.

(Record at 54.)

The trial court gave no indication that venue should be
determined by the statutes concerning venue that were in effect
when an agreement containing a forum-selection clause was signed.
It seems more likely that the trial court implicitly recognized
that venue is properly governed by statutes in effect at the time
litigation is commenced but inadvertently quoted a superseded
version of the relevant statutec
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Presently § 78-13-4 provides in pertinent parts
When the defendant has signed a contract in the state to
perform an obligation, an action on the contract. . .
may be brought in the county where such obligation is to
be performed, the contract was signed, or in which the
defendant resides.
Since the Defendant in the instant case signed the agreement
under consideration, i.e.,

the Master License and Marketing

Agreement in California (Record at 43.), the permissive provisions
of § 78-13-4 are inapplicable; and the controlling directive is
the mandatory strictures of § 78-13-7 Utah Code Annotated (1953):
In all other cases the action must be tried in the
county in which the cause of action arises, or in the
county in which any defendant resides at the
commencement of the action; provided, that if any such
defendant is a corporation, any county in which such
corporation has its principal office or place of
business shall be deemed the county in which such
corporation resides within the meaning of this section.
If none of the defendants resides in this state, such
action may be commenced and tried in any county which
the plaintiff may designate in his complaint. . . .
(emphasis added)
Although Article VIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution was
amended in 1985 and no longer contains the explicit language
concerning venue that was quoted supra, it is instructive that
§ 78-13-7 Utah Code Annotated

(1953) was enacted under such

Constitutional language and that there is no indication of an
intent to alter the rule that venue may be changed from the court
where common law would place it only when a statute authorizes
such change*
The final sentence in the quotation from § 78-13-7 lends
additional credence to the argument that the term "county" as used
in the Utah statutes concerning venue means county within the

State of Utah.

Certainly

it would be neither

logical nor

Constitutional to permit a plaintiff to bring suit in any county
of the United States (or another country) simply because none of
the defendants resides in Utah.
Plaintiff and Appellant, Lundahl Instruments, Inc., properly
followed the guidance of § 78-13-7 and commenced its action in
Cache County because Defendant and Appellee, Safety Technology,
Inc., is a corporate resident of California (Record at 1.) and the
cause of action arose in Cache County in that Defendant and
Appellee, Safety Technology, failed to send payment for the goods
it received from Plaintiff and Appellant, Lundahl Instruments, and
such payment was to have been sent to Plaintiff and Appellant,
Lundahl Instruments, in Cache County.

(Record at 44.)

The Supreme Court of Idaho in McCarthy v. Herrick, 240 P.
192, 193 (Idaho 1925), considered whether a contractual provision
for venue could displace a statutory directive which utilized
mandatory language similar to that of Utah Code Annotated § 78-137 and declared?
To thus authorize the commencement and maintenance of an
action in any other county than that fixed by statute is
not a proper subject of contract.
Recently, in Cerami-Kote, Inc. v. Eneroywave Corp., 773 P.2d
1143 (Idaho 1989), the Supreme Court of Idaho was required to
apply Florida law to determine the validity of a forum-selection
clause.

The Idaho Supreme Court determined that Florida had

chosen to adopt the reasoning from M/S Bremen v* Zapata Off-Shore
COce, supra, which Florida viewed as imposing three conditions
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that must exist in order for a forum-selection clause to be
enforceable:
1.
The forum was not chosen because of
overwhelming bargaining powers on the part of one party
which would constitute overreaching at the other's
expense *
2.
Enforcement would not contravene a strong
policy.enunciated by statute or judicial fiat, either in
the forum where the suit would be brought, or the forum
from which the suit has been excluded.
3. The purpose was not to transfer an essentially
local dispute to a remote and alien forum in order to
seriously inconvenience one or both or the parties.
Cerami-Kote, supra at 1146, quoting Maritime Limited Partnership
v. Greenman Advertising Associates, Inc., 455 So.2d 1121 (Fla.
App. 4th Dist. 1984) (emphasis in Idaho opinion but not in Florida
decision).

The Supreme Court of Idaho then found that the

requisite "strong policy enunciated by statute" was provided by
I.C. § 29-110:
Limitations on rights to sue. - Every stipulation
or condition in a contract by which any party thereto is
restricted from enforcing his rights under the contract
by the usual proceedings in the original tribunals, or
which limits the time within which he may thus enforce
his rights, is void.
Cerami-Kote^ supra at 1146 (emphasis in original).
Since this Idaho statute is only slightly more explicit than
§ 78-13-7 Utah Code Annotated (1953), the policy enunciated in
§ 78-13-7 that the action must be tried in the county in which the
cause of action arises; or, if none of the defendants resides in
Utah, in any county the plaintiff designates would - even if the
Bremen analysis were applicable - demonstrate that the instant
forum-selection clause should not be enforced.
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In the only case where the Supreme Court of Utah has
considered this conflict between statute and contract, i...e.. ,
Petersen v. Qgden Union Railway and Depot Co»f 175 P.2d 744, 747
M

(Utah 1946), the Court ruled:

. * . venue is a privilege which

may be waived, but it may not be contracted away in the face of a
specific statute which prohibits such contracting, as does Section
5 of the Employer's Liability Act, . ."

EVEN IF ENFORCEMENT OF A FORUM-SELECTION
CLAUSE IS PROPER, SUCH CLAUSE SHOULD NOT BE
READ AS A MANDATORY DIRECTIVE UNLESS SUCH
CLAUSE EXPLICITLY SO PROVIDES.
Even were it appropriate to enforce the instant forumselection

clause,

the

language

of

such

clause

is

merely

permissive.
Venue for any litigation arising out of this Agreement,
or in connection with the transactions contemplated
hereby, shall lie in any federal or state court sitting
in Defendant's state, with proper jurisdiction over the
subject-matter thereof. Therefore, if [plaintiff] were
to commence an action against [defendant], jurisdiction
would be in California; if [defendant] were to file an
action against [plaintiff], jurisdiction would be in
Utah.
(Record at 54.)
This clause neither asserts that it is establishing the "sole
and exclusive" venue, nor that it is "ousting the Utah courts of
venue" should Lundahl Instruments, Inc. sue Safety Technology,
Inc.
courts

And certainly a minimal requirement for denying the Utah
an

performance

opportunity
of

a

to

adjudicate

contract

disenfranchisement be explicitc

in

Utah

a

dispute

should

be

involving
that

such
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Examples of mandatory forum-selection clauses can be found in
the three decisions by the United States Supreme Court that were
discussed supra.

In Bremen, supra at 2 (emphasis added), the

provision stated:
Any dispute arising must be treated before the London
Court of Justice.
The clause in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., supra at
24 (footnote 1) (emphasis added), declared:
Dealer and Ricoh agree that any appropriate state or
federal district court located in the Borough of
Manhattan, New York City, New York, shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over any case or controversy arising under
or in connection with this Agreement and shall be a
proper forum in which to adjudicate such case or
controversy.
And the language in Carnival Cruise Lines, supra at 628 (emphasis
added) read s
It is agreed by and between the passenger and the
Carrier that all disputes and matters whatsoever arising
under, in connection with or incident to the Contract
shall be litigated, if at all, in and before a Court
located in the State of Florida, USA, to the exclusion
of the courts of any other state or country.
AND THE EQUITIES OF THIS CASE ARGUE FOR
VENUE IN UTAH.
The instant case is essentially simply a failure by the
Defendant

to pay

for goods

received

pursuant

to

a Uniform

Commercial Code Article 2 sales contract.
Orders for the relevant goods were sent by Defendant to Utah
where they were accepted.

The goods were sent from Utah to

California by common carrier.
from Utah.

Invoices for the goods were sent

Defendant was to send payment for the goods to Utah.

1?
And the relevant docimentary evidence is located in Utah. (Record
at 4 6 .)
Substantial

support

for

this

view

of

the

equities ,

furthermore, arises from Walker Bank & Trust Co. vc Walker, 631
Pe2d 860 (Utah 1981), where the Utah Supreme Court found venue to
be proper in Salt Lake County (as opposed to another Utah county)
because the contract performance, iL^e^, payment on a credit card
account, was due in Salt Lake County*
IN FACT, THE UNDERLYING CONTRACT HAS
BEEN TERMINATED.
Additional
statutory

justification

directive

for

refusing

for venue with

a

to

displace

contractual

the

provision

proceeds from the fact that the Master Licensing and Marketing
Agreement was arguably terminated in February of 1991. (Record at
33, 40, 41, and 45.) This Agreement was, furthermore, negotiated
in Utah, as essentially was its termination.

(Record at 45.)

It would, indeed, seem peculiar to permit a Defendant to
escape the

scrutiny

of the Utah

provision in a defunct contract.

judicial

system

through a

The Defendant in the instant

case should be treated in the same manner as any customer who has
failed to pay his bill. And the instant Motion To Dismiss should,
therefore, be denied.

CONCLUSION
Appellant, therefore, respectfully requests that this Court
rule that the instant forum-selection clause doe snot preclude
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venue in First Judicial District of the State of Utah, in and for
the County of Cache; reverse the decision by the Trial Court
dismissing the instant action; and remand the instant action to
the District Court for a trial on the merits.

DATED this / g^

day of December, 1991.
OLSON & HOGGAN

Thompson
Thomps« E. Fehr
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing
Brief Of Appellant to Defendant's Attorney, David E. Hardy, of
Allen Nelson Hardy & Evans, at 215 South State Street, Suite 900,
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, postage prepaid in Logan, Utah, this
;<?4k day of December, 1991.

Thompson E. Fehr
wpd/tef/sti.bri
N-2483.18

ADDENDUM
for
The Trial Court's

Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law,
and Final Order

David E. Hardy, Esq. (13 67)
Charlotte K* Wightman, Esq. (5821)
ALLEN NELSON HARDY & EVANS
Attorneys for Defendant
215 South State Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-8400
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE
LUNDAHL INSTRUMENTS, INC.,
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND FINAL ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 910000418

SAFETY TECHNOLOGY, INC.,

Judge F. L. Gunnel1

Defendant.

Defendant Safety Technology, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss having
been properly

submitted

to this Court, and the Court having

reviewed the pleadings and papers and arguments of counsel related
thereto, as well as all other pleadings and papers on file, and
having issued its Memorandum Decision dated August 19, 1991, the
Court issues the following findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and final order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff and defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and at

arms length negotiated and entered into a Master Licensing and
Marketing Agreement (the "Contract") dated April 21, 1989.
cnc\2881
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2.

The Contract contains a forum selection clause set forth

in Section 8*12, which provides in relevant part as follows:
Venue for any litigation arising out of this
Agreement,
or
in
connection
with
the
transactions contemplated hereby, shall lie in
any federal or state court sitting in
Defendants state, with proper jurisdiction
over the subject-matter thereof. Therefore,
if [plaintiff] were to commence an action
against [defendant], jurisdiction would be in
California; if [defendant] were to file an
action against [plaintiff], jurisdiction would
be in Utah.
3.

The Contract's

forum

selection

clause

is clear and

unambiguous.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-4 (1951) provides as follows:
When the defendant has contracted in writing
to perform an obligation in a particular
county of the state and resides in another
county, an action on such contract obligation
may be commenced and tried in the county where
such obligation is to be performed or in which
the defendant resides.

2.

As set forth in the Contract's forum selection clause,

plaintiff and defendant expressly elected prior to this litigation
a venue that is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-4.
3.

The Contract's

forum

selection

clause

is valid

and

enforceable.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and consistent with the Courtfs Memorandum Decision dated
August 19, 1991, and for good cause appearing,
cnc\2881
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's Motion to Dismiss be and
is hereby granted and plaintifffs Complaint, and all claims alleged
therein, are hereby dismissed without prejudice.
DATED this

$Q

day of September, 1991 •
BY THE COURT:

F. L. Gunnel1
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
true

and

accurate

copy

of

the

/JT

day of September, 1991, a

foregoing

FINDINGS

OF

FACT,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND FINAL ORDER was served by first-class mail,
postage prepaid, upon:
Brad H. Bearnson, Esq.
OLSEN & HOGGAN, P.C.
56 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321
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